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Abstract 
 
In this article we investigate the implementation of programs intended to 
ensure that defendants in criminal courts receive legal counsel at their 
first appearances before judges.  Efforts to reform court practices are 
often stymied by courts’ fragmented and adversarial structures and by 
reformers’ misconceptions about how they operate.  We find that the 
public defense administrators who voluntarily launched these programs 
largely overcame these difficulties by adopting incremental approaches 
to expanding defense services, designing programs that were adapted to 
local conditions, and by persevering in the face of political resistance.   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Reforming criminal courts is not for the faint of heart.  A long line of social 
science research studies has demonstrated that few attempts to change court 
processes live up to expectations.
1
  Some reforms fall short because they are based 
                                                                                                                                      
†   We gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Institute of Justice, under Grant 
2014-IJ-CX-0027, comments on prior drafts from Jon Gould and Janet Moore, and the valued 
assistance of University interns Alyssa Clark, Victoria Farrell, and Katherine Rhee.  The observations 
and conclusions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the New York State Office of Indigent Legal Services. 
   Associate Professor, School of Criminal Justice, University at Albany, State University of 
New York. 
   Director of Research, New York State Office of Indigent Legal Services. 
  Doctoral student, School of Criminal Justice, University at Albany, State University of 
New York. 
 Doctoral student, School of Criminal Justice, University at Albany, State University of 
New York. 
1   See Courts, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, http://www.crimesolutions.gov/TopicDetails.aspx?
ID=3 (last visited Feb. 26, 2017) (reviewing 66 programs where 13 are rated “effective,” 10 are rated 
 
522                      OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW            [Vol 14:521 
on overly optimistic assumptions about how court decisions will affect defendants 
or victims.  But other efforts fail because they are not implemented as their authors 
had envisioned.  These “failures” seldom make headlines, but they represent 
missed opportunities to improve legal systems. 
This article reports on the implementation of five upstate New York county 
programs designed to ensure that indigent criminal defendants were provided 
counsel at the first court appearance.
2
  This phase of adjudication is extremely 
important.  At first appearance, defendants should learn of the charges against 
them and of their right to counsel; they may be subjected to pretrial incarceration if 
they are not offered or are unable to post bail;
3
 and if the first appearance includes 
arraignment, they may even plead guilty before investigation or advocacy occurs.
4
 
When first appearances include plea entries, the process is a “critical stage” of 
the prosecution and defendants have a right to counsel’s presence and effective 
assistance.
5
  Some courts, including New York’s highest court, extend the same 
right to first appearances that include decisions on bail and pretrial release.
6
  
Unfortunately, requirements for counsel at first appearance (CAFA) are 
inconsistently realized in practice.
7
  New York responded to these problems with 
the three-year grant CAFA improvement projects discussed in this article. 
In examining these programs’ development and implementation, we frame 
our inquiry around Malcolm Feeley’s thesis that court reforms are more likely to 
fail than to succeed,
8
 and draw conclusions about the conditions under which such 
reforms are likely to be successful.  At first glance, it might appear that these 
initiatives’ chances for success were uncertain.  They faced skepticism and 
opposition at state as well as local levels, and they deployed tax dollars for an 
unpopular constituency, people accused of committing crimes.  Yet we found that 
all five programs overcame obstacles to implementation and launched largely as 
                                                                                                                                                   
“ineffective,” and the remainder are only rated “promising,” which typically reflects limited evidence 
of successful outcomes).  See also Markus B. Zimmer, The Challenge of Judicial Reform in Post-
Conflict States, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 645 (2011). 
2   The study investigated six programs, but reports on five because the sixth county had not 
completed program implementation at the time of this writing. 
3   See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 202–03 (2008). 
4   See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961). 
5   Id.   
6   See NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, DON’T I NEED A 
LAWYER?: PRETRIAL JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT FIRST JUDICIAL BAIL HEARING 16 n.70 
(2015), www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/RTC-DINAL_3.18.15.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q4S6-F8A4] (citing Hurrell-Harring v. State, 15 N.Y.3d 8 (2010)). 
7   Id. at 24–30; see also SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR. & PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., EARLY 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL: THE LAW, IMPLEMENTATION, AND BENEFITS (2014); ALISA SMITH & SEAN 
MADDAN, THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2011) 
(showing a significant relationship between waiver of counsel and probability of guilty plea). 
8   MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL (2013). 
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originally planned. 
We report our research in five sections.  First, we review the emergence of 
CAFA as a law and policy problem.  Second, beginning with Feeley’s seminal 
court reform research, we inventory the challenges that attend court reform.
9
  
Third, we describe the five programs that counties designed to provide CAFA.  
Fourth, we document the implementation processes in each county.  Fifth, we 
consider the implications of our findings for not only CAFA, but also the broader 
issue of court reform.  
 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF CAFA AS A LEGAL AND POLICY PROBLEM 
 
In 2012, Attorney General Eric Holder directed attention to the importance of 
early access to counsel, and to the plight of “too many defendants [who] are left to 
languish in jail for weeks, or even months, before counsel is appointed.”10  That 
same year, Lafler v. Cooper
11
 and Missouri v. Frye
12
 focused on ineffective 
representation during plea negotiations, highlighting the need for lawyering at the 
earliest stage in criminal proceedings. 
The outcomes of first appearances can include pretrial release rulings and plea 
entries, decisions that carry heightened risks for uncounseled defendants.  
Unfortunately, only 14 states guarantee CAFA.
13
  A recent survey of New York 
magistrates (judges who preside over village and town courts) revealed that almost 
half reported that CAFA was “seldom” available during regular court hours, and 
89% reported the same for off-hours arraignments.
14
 
In 2010, New York Court of Appeals highlighted this deficit in Hurrell-
Harring et al. v. State of New York, holding that plaintiffs had been 
unconstitutionally denied CAFA.
15
  In 2011, the state legislature created the New 
York Office of Indigent Legal Services (ILS) “to monitor, study and make efforts 
to improve the quality” of public defense.16  As is true of almost half the states, 
                                                                                                                                      
9   Id. 
10  Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the American Bar 
Association’s National Summit on Indigent Defense (Feb. 4, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-american-bar-association-s-national-summit-indigent 
[https://perma.cc/3X8J-ZMG8]. 
11  132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
12  132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
13  See NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra note 6.  
14  N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVS., SUMMARY REPORT OF THE 2014 SURVEY OF 
TOWN AND VILLAGE MAGISTRATES: COUNSEL AT FIRST APPEARANCE 22–23 figs. 8 & 9 (2014). 
15  See Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 930 N.E.2d 217, 223–24 (2010) (citing Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). 
16  N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 832 (1) (2011), https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/Executive%20Law%20832-
833.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FD2-2L5N]. 
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New York requires county governments to fund and organize indigent defense.
17
  
ILS is authorized to grant partial funding for defense services, and it focuses 
primarily on the 57 counties outside of New York City.
18
  In 2012, ILS dedicated 
$12 million in state funds for competitive three-year grants to counties to improve 
CAFA.
19
 
Thus by 2012 upstate New York was primed for an overhaul of existing 
CAFA practices.  But this overhaul required more than a statehouse commitment 
to a valued principle—it required significant changes in the everyday work of 
hundreds of courts.  As we explain below, optimism and principle, even when 
accompanied by funding, often fall short of changing routines and practices.  
 
III. THE CHALLENGES OF COURT REFORM 
 
In his classic study Court Reform on Trial: Why Simple Solutions Fail, 
Malcolm Feeley argued that “[i]t is rare to find an innovation that is carefully 
initiated and even rarer to see one successfully implemented.  But it is rarer still to 
find a workable new idea well institutionalized.”20  Feeley’s pessimistic outlook 
was informed by his familiarity with historical, legal, practical, and political 
perspectives on court behavior.
21
  This section discusses Feeley’s five-stage 
framework, which inventories characteristics of courts that often compromise 
reform efforts.
22
  To summarize briefly, in the first stage a problem must be 
defined.  Second, reformers must initiate a solution, typically a new policy or 
program.  Third, someone must accept (or be given) responsibility for 
implementing the solution.  Fourth, the new policy or program must be routinized 
and adjusted so that it is compatible with other organizational processes and 
objectives.  Finally, the reform should be evaluated to assess whether its objectives 
                                                                                                                                      
17  NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: 
AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 54 (2009), 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D4R-
9LCE]; see also COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT TO THE CHIEF 
JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 15 (2006), http://nycourts.gov/ip/indigentdefense-commission/
IndigentDefenseCommission_report06.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RLF-5EJY] (urging replacement of 
patch-worked local programs with statewide funding and organization). 
18  See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 98-b (2003).  
19  Joel Stashenko, 25 Counties Get Grants to Provide Counsel at Arraignments, N.Y. LAW J. 
(Aug. 8, 2013), https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/NYLJ%20Counsel%20At%20First%20Appearance%20
Awards%20080813.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7KG-7FPA].  
20  FEELEY, supra note 8, at 126. 
21  Professor Feeley’s scholarship spans almost five decades and addresses appellate court 
decision making, state and local crime and justice policy making, impact litigation, court reform, and 
studies of comparative and federalist government.  See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, CURRICULUM VITAE 
(Sept. 4, 2013), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/faculty/facultyCVPDF.php?facID=37 
[https://perma.cc/HSB3-HYFT]. 
22   FEELEY, supra note 8, at 25–26. 
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were achieved, and if so, at what cost and with what unanticipated consequences. 
Under the most benign circumstances this sequence presents many pitfalls, 
but Feeley suggests that the criminal courts, more than most government 
organizations, are designed and operate in ways that leave little room for optimism.  
We focus here on what Feeley refers to as fragmentation, adversarialism, and the 
fallacy of formalism as potential barriers to effective reform.
23
  We then review the 
conditions that Feeley identifies as critical to overcoming these challenges, and, in 
this context, evaluate the CAFA reforms in the five counties. 
 
A. Fragmentation 
 
Criminal courts and related agencies have competing interests.
24
  Feeley 
asserts that the resulting interactions “are more akin to Adam Smith’s notion of 
unplanned, unconscious coordination in the pursuit of self-interest than to any 
theory of rational organization”25 insofar as decisions are made and results are 
produced without central planning, goal-setting, or assessment.  He places criminal 
justice actors’ decisions in the context of game-playing, each actor seeking to 
maximize advantage.  But he also notes that not everyone is playing the same 
game: judges seek expeditious verdicts, prosecutors pursue public order and safety, 
and defense lawyers strategize to advantage their clients’ outcomes.  The result is 
fragmentation: multiple actors pursuing different agendas from the same sets of 
charges, evidence, and rules.
26
 
Criminal justice organizations, particularly those engaged in adjudication, are 
accountable to different authorities.  In most states trial judges
27
 and chief 
prosecutors
28
 are accountable to voters.  Defense lawyers are ethically accountable 
for protecting their clients’ rights and interests, but lawyers in private practice must 
also look after the interests of their firms.  Lawyers who practice in indigent 
defense agencies work in a variety of office settings, and those who administer 
such programs are also, as managers, accountable to local and state authorities. 
Additional tensions arise from a scaffolding principle of American 
                                                                                                                                      
23  Id. at 6–8, 123, 125. 
24   Id. at 6–7. 
25   Id. at 7. 
26   Id.  
27  See AM. BAR ASS’N, FACT SHEET ON JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS IN THE STATES, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/fact_sheet.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PXW8-ZJM4].  
28  See STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T  OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 2 
(2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf [https://perma.cc/CRD9-2PKN]; see also, e.g., 
SPECIAL COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF N.Y. STATE COURTS, JUSTICE MOST LOCAL: THE FUTURE OF 
TOWN AND VILLAGE COURTS IN NEW YORK STATE 7 (2008) (discussing different constituencies to 
whom judges and prosecutors are accountable), http://www.nycourtreform.org/Justice_Most_Local
_Part1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5R4C-PMB5].   
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government, the separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches.  That principle ensures that the lines of accountability in 
organizations at the courts’ periphery, such as law enforcement and corrections 
agencies, are independent of those of court actors.  Most law enforcement 
authorities answer to executives, such as mayors and governors; jails and probation 
are typically regulated by state agencies.  Funding for these functions may be the 
province of local or state legislatures.  Judicial authorities may write the rules for 
court administration.  And the essential functions and missions of these 
organizations are not necessarily compatible.  While in theory these actors might 
work together with the courts to provide satisfactory criminal justice process 
outcomes, in practice they operate along independent trajectories.
29
 
A second scaffolding principle of U.S. government is federalism: the 
stipulation of powers and authority that exist at each level of government.  A 
federalist regime that grants some degree of autonomy to each level of government 
ensures that there are limits to what states can command local governments to do 
and guarantees that service delivery will reflect local resources, needs, and 
politics.
30
  In New York, indigent defense is provided by a mix of institutional 
programs, assigned counsel panels, non-profit legal aid bureaus, and public 
defenders.
31
  Since court reforms rely on the voluntary cooperation of different 
criminal justice agencies, and typically do not clearly identify any central authority 
that can oversee and enforce changes, the responsibility for implementation cannot 
be traced back to all potentially responsible parties or organizations. 
 
B. Adversarialism 
 
In the United States, criminal adjudication is formally structured as a zero-
sum adversarial process in which each party pursues a win at his opponent’s 
expense.
32
  In this process, neither prosecutor nor defense has an incentive to 
contribute to objectives beyond his or her own case or career.  Professor Gary 
Goodpaster described the logic behind the adversarial trial as the “truth theory:” 
the implied assumption that through lightly regulated verbal combat, an attentive 
but passive audience will discern the truth about contested facts.
33
  This 
perspective is grounded at the level of the individual case.  But the concept of 
adversarialism goes beyond individual cases: the dualism between “crime control” 
                                                                                                                                      
29  FEELEY, supra note 8, at 6–12. 
30  For an extended discussion and critique of federalism in the U.S. context, see MALCOLM M. 
FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY & TRAGIC COMPROMISE (2011). 
31   N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722.  
32  JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 80–101 
(1973). 
33  Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 118 (1987). 
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and “due process” concerns34 may be expressed at the local level as policy and 
practice disagreements.   
 
C. The Fallacy of Formalism 
 
Understanding how trial courts work is a challenge for most newcomers, and 
understanding how to change them requires experience and expertise.  Even for 
experts, it is difficult to explain to the public how fragmentation and 
adversarialism might confound new policies, and it is also difficult to present 
practical solutions to skeptical practitioners.  Hence, many policies are crafted 
under the fallacy of formalism: “[r]eliance on formal description of the criminal 
justice process as a basis for diagnosing problems and constructing remedies . . . .”35  
Idealistic reforms have noble goals—for example, mandatory sentencing laws 
ought to reduce recidivism,
36
 and mental health courts ought to reduce 
incarceration and recidivism by linking defendants who have mental illnesses to 
mental health services.
37
  But such reforms are often based on textbook models of 
adjudication that include orderly progression of hearings and decisions, clear roles 
for all actors, formal trials, adherence to the law on the books and access to appeal.  
Overlooked in this model are the day-to-day disorderly realities of plea 
negotiations, tight schedules, resource deficits, and discretionary decisions.  
Simple solutions can appeal to simplified values, while conveniently sidestepping 
the real conditions that caused the problems in the first place.
38
 
 
D. Obstacles and Opportunities 
 
Feeley offers some optimism about court reform, even in the context of the 
structural and political complications noted above.  He argues that a practical and 
problem-oriented approach, though not commonly observed in court reform 
efforts, holds some promise. 
This approach embraces a concept of responsive law and fosters a consumer 
perspective on the courts and in so doing identifies problems as perceived and 
actually experienced by those who daily use and work in the courts.  It insists upon 
a realism and a sensitivity to the details of administration.  As such, it can focus 
attention on solutions to concrete problems.
39
  
                                                                                                                                      
34  Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9–23 (1964). 
35  FEELEY, supra note 8, at 123. 
36  Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901 (1991). 
37  See Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, Criminalization of People with Mental Illnesses: 
The Role of Mental Health Courts in System Reform, 7 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 143 (2003). 
38  FEELEY, supra note 8, at 12–13, 123. 
39  Id. at 132. 
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1. Problem Definition 
 
Defining policy problems is inherently political: the process involves disputes 
about whether the problem is weighty enough to require attention, who should be 
involved in addressing it, and how to frame it for public debate.  Criminal justice 
problems are often defined in urgent terms that are chosen to generate strong 
emotions such as solicitude for victims, outrage against offenders, or dismay about 
violations of defendants’ rights.  Often the people doing this sort of framing—
legislators, appellate court judges, and advocates—are quite removed from the 
people who work in the courts.
40
  
 
2. Initiation 
 
It is not easy to match possible solutions to problems, because implicit in 
solutions are hypotheses about the causes of the problem.  Solutions (policy 
proposals) may take the form of practical suggestions or symbolic expressions 
about values.  Feeley suggests that the more remote the policy maker is from the 
reform site, the less likely the reform is to be effectively and successfully adopted.  
Feeley also suggests, however, that “problem-oriented” reforms, which address 
practical barriers and opportunities, rather than emphasize behavioral and moral 
imperatives, are more likely to succeed.
41
 
 
3. Implementation and Routinization 
 
Addressing the difficulties of transforming a general idea into practical policy 
changes, Feeley observed, 
 
Given the lack of incentives for system wide changes within the courts, it 
is not surprising that innovation should often come from outsiders.  Thus, 
another dilemma: those who are in the best position to assess the needs 
of the courts have the least incentive to innovate, while those who have 
the incentive do not have the detailed knowledge.
42
   
 
Feeley suggests that implementation is likely to be stymied when reform plans 
demand rigid adherence to protocols, are undertaken in overworked organizations 
with high caseloads, and are premised on prioritizing efficiency and costs 
savings.
43
  Programs are more likely to be fully implemented when those 
responsible for participating are in concurrence about the significance of the 
                                                                                                                                      
40  Id. at 124. 
41  Id. at 132  
42  Id. at 124. 
43  Id. at 26–27.  
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problem as well as the appropriateness of the reform, when organizational 
leadership is established and respected, when resources are adequate, and when the 
reform allows for local adaptations.  Reforms are also more apt to become 
implemented in good faith when key actors across court organizations agree to 
collaborate, when the target organization has the capacity to acknowledge and 
accommodate those actors’ needs, and when—importantly—the organization has 
the resources, political capital, and legitimacy to withstand criticisms from within 
the court community.
44
  
But getting a program off the ground does not ensure its long-term survival.  
Routinization—the long-term integration of a new policy or program into existing 
practices and protocols—can be compromised by loss of interest, loss of financial 
support (or even fear of such loss in the future), active lobbying by practitioners to 
return to old practices, and changes in advocacy and leadership.  A failure of 
routinization can be as simple as quiet abandonment of an innovation, or as 
complex as a prolonged public challenge over continued funding.
45
 
 
4. Evaluation 
 
Ideally programs and policies are assessed, using appropriate methods and 
standards, once they have become a routine part of the court’s operations.  The 
purpose of evaluation, of course, is to determine whether the programs—assuming 
they were implemented as planned—in fact have the positive outcomes they 
promised.  But evaluations also should attend to the costs of such programs, the 
balance of measurable benefits to costs, and to any unintended consequences.
46
  
This is a critically important part of assessing reforms, and our current research 
will provide data on those outcomes within the next year. 
 
IV. THE UPSTATE NEW YORK CAFA PROJECTS 
 
In November 2013 ILS released a request for proposals
47
 that invited upstate 
counties to devise programs to improve provisions of CAFA.  The solicitation 
encouraged counties to identify approaches best suited to local circumstances.  
These improvements included shifts in staffing, plans for on-call arraignment 
representation, and a variety of accommodations that recognized variability in 
local needs.  Twenty-five of 57 eligible counties applied, and all were granted 
funds at about requested levels.  For this implementation study, we selected five 
                                                                                                                                      
44  Id. at 26. 
45  Id. at 27. 
46  Id. at 128. 
47  N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVS., FUNDING ANNOUNCEMENT: COUNSEL AT 
FIRST APPEARANCE DEMONSTRATION GRANT (2012), https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/RFP%20For%20
Counsel%20At%20First%20Appearance%20113012.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HWK-MWEB]. 
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counties that represented diverse program innovations, levels of urbanization, and 
systems for delivery of public defense services.  One county included a large urban 
center surrounded by suburban townships, three had smaller cities and sizeable 
rural areas, and one was sprawling and sparsely populated.  One county employed 
private assigned counsel as the primary means of providing representation, and 
four had public defender programs as primary counsel.  We identify them as Bleek, 
Hudson, Lake, Moose, and Polar Counties.
48
  
Courts of original jurisdiction in criminal cases in upstate New York—at 
which CAFA must be provided—include 61 city courts (presided over by elected 
judges who must have practiced law for at least five years)
49
 and over 1,000 
township and village courts overseen by lay magistrates (who are required only to 
be local residents
50
 and who more often than not never attended law school).
51
  In 
the counties outside New York City, a substantial majority of residents live within 
these rural and suburban townships and villages, not in the 61 cities with city 
courts.
52
 
New York law requires arresting officers to transfer any arrestee directly to 
the nearest court, or to one in an adjoining jurisdiction, for immediate arraignment, 
in both misdemeanor and most felony cases; usually misdemeanor charges remain 
in the arraigning court through disposition.
53
  Hence, these town and village courts 
play a large role in the implementation of CAFA policies, and the remote character 
of the courts means that the logistics of providing CAFA can be enormously 
challenging. 
These counties offered a variety of approaches to CAFA.  Hudson, Lake and 
Polar Counties identified deficiencies in existing practices of ensuring CAFA and 
sought to ameliorate them.  One county sought funding to provide CAFA in courts 
outside the large municipality where the service was already established.  Two 
counties sought to expand existing programs to days or times when CAFA was not 
                                                                                                                                      
48  Program evaluation will not be completed until 2017, and we are committed to maintaining 
confidentiality until project completion and unless key participants agree to be identified.  Although 
all statements are documented in our field notes (on file with the authors), we, therefore, do not 
specifically identify names of counties or individuals, nor do we identify documents, news reports, or 
observations by site. 
49  Methods of Judicial Selection: Limited Jurisdiction Courts, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS 
(2016), http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/limited_jurisdiction_courts.cfm?
state= [https://perma.cc/6N77-5D4G].  
50  Id. 
51  William Glaberson, In Tiny Courts of N.Y, Abuses of Law and Power, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
25, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/nyregion/25courts.html?fta=y [https://perma.cc/
4GEW-7RYJ]. 
52  See List of Cities in New York, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cities_in_
New_York [https://perma.cc/V22C-5RHU] (last visited Mar. 16, 2017) (compiling 2011 population 
estimates). 
53  See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 140.20. 
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available—particularly at night and on weekends.  In contrast, Bleek and Moose 
Counties had to start from scratch in planning programs to guarantee CAFA for the 
first time in a central location, at certain times, or for certain kinds of cases.  Table 
1 summarizes the five different programs. 
 
Table 1. Summary of Five Programs as Designed and Implemented 
 
County Demography Defense provider(s) 
Design and scope… 
…as planned …as implemented 
Bleek Rural, one 
small city 
Assigned counsel drawn 
from small firms; 20% 
participated in CAFA. 
Arraignments in city court 
consolidated into 8–10am 
weekday sessions.  Overnight 
arrestees no longer arraigned 
immediately, but held in jail 
pending session.  Select pool of 
attorneys rotate CAFA 
assignments. 
On call period 
extended to whole 
day. 
Hudson Urban, 
suburban, 
rural 
Public defender office 
with about 15 attorneys; 
conflict defender office; 
assigned counsel as 
backup. 
CAFA extended from weekdays 
in 1 city court to 24/7 in both 
city courts & 8 other courts; 2 
attorneys hired for this purpose. 
Coverage 
extended to more 
courts than 
expected. 
Lake Rural, two 
small cities 
Public defender office 
with about 12 attorneys; 
small conflict defender 
office; assigned counsel 
for further conflicts. 
Existing program consolidated 
arraignments from all magistrate 
courts & 1 city court in daily, 
centralized sessions; 
supplemented with counsel in 
other city court and scheduled 
arraignments of appearance 
ticket cases; funding used to add 
2 attorneys, 1 support staff, and 
computer equipment. 
As planned. 
Moose Rural Public defender and 
conflict defender offices 
with assigned counsel 
as backup; fewer than 
10 attorneys in all. 
Pre-program, defenders 
appeared in courts during 
regular sessions.  Funding used 
to improve staffing, freeing 
attorneys to be on call at off-
hours arraignments. 
Program provides 
CAFA in all 
felony cases. 
Polar Urban/ 
suburban 
Public defender office; 
conflict defender office 
for city; assigned 
counsel as backup; total 
of 60 attorneys. 
Arraignment representation in 
the large, urban city court 
already provided; program 
expanded through “on call” 
program to all magistrates’ 
courts weekdays 8am–8pm.   
3 attorneys would be hired. 
Program 
implemented 
program in all 
courts, 24/7, 
through addition 
of other funds. 
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We investigated the CAFA reforms using a cross-case methodology,
54
 a 
research design based on intensive investigation and comparison of community 
change efforts that all target a common objective.  Professor Robert Yin suggests 
that “the case study is the method of choice when the phenomenon under study is 
not readily distinguishable from its context.”55  We are interested in understanding 
whether CAFA programs were implemented as planned (and, ultimately, if they 
alter decision processes and outcomes), but differences in counties’ political 
climates, defense program leadership, resources and challenges form the contexts 
in which not only were plans hatched, but also the conditions within which they 
were to be carried out.  Hence we purposefully chose sites that differed across 
these contextual features, in order to describe the impacts of context on 
implementation. 
Our primary research questions are these: Did these five programs face the 
challenges that Feeley predicted?  How did these challenges vary across sites?  
Most importantly, how if at all did program administrators address these 
challenges, and with what implications for implementation of their CAFA 
programs?  Our methodological approach distinctly respects the differences in 
adaptation across courthouses and also acknowledges the need to understand the 
complexity, variability, and unpredictability of communities’ social problems and 
resources, and the unavoidable fact that specific innovation models will be adapted 
in different and sometimes unpredictable ways by practitioners in varying 
settings.
56
  This approach also focuses attention on comparisons of local 
adaptations of policy ideals to practical constraints and opportunities.  
We grounded our observations and conclusions on information gathered 
through on-site observations over multiple visits to each site (approximately one 
hundred days in total).
57
  Visits typically included at least two authors, and 
comprised formal and informal meetings involving policy and practice topics as 
well as in-court observation.  We also reviewed historical documents about the 
indigent defense programs, notes from conversations and meetings among ILS 
                                                                                                                                      
54  Kien S. Lee & David M. Chavis, Cross-Case Methodology: Bringing Rigour to Community 
and Systems Change Research and Evaluation, 22 J. CMTY. & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 428 (2012); 
ROBERT K. YIN, APPLICATIONS OF CASE STUDY RESEARCH (2d ed. 2003). 
55  YIN, supra note 54, at 4. 
56  Prudence Brown, Evaluating and Learning From Community Change Efforts, in VOICES 
FROM THE FIELD III: LESSONS AND CHALLENGES FROM TWO DECADES OF COMMUNITY CHANGE 
EFFORTS 95 (Anne C. Kubisch et al. eds., 2010); VOICES FROM THE FIELD II: REFLECTIONS ON 
COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY CHANGE (Anne C. Kubisch et al. eds., 2002); YIN, supra note 54, at 4.  
57  The project involves both the study of implementation of programs (as reported here) and 
gathering of case-level data from time periods before, immediately after, and one year after the 
CAFA programs were implemented, in order to test hypotheses about the effects of attorneys’ 
presence on interim and final case decisions and outcomes.  Hence the research team spent significant 
time during these visits in court observation and meetings with defense program staff and others 
involved in the CAFA initiatives.  We did not conduct formal (structured) interviews with these 
individuals; we did engage in conversations that they initiated. 
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staff, notes from informal conversations with court staff and defenders that 
unfolded while on site, tracking of media accounts related to the courts and 
indigent defense, programs’ reports on caseloads and spending, and requests for 
funding submitted to ILS.
58
 
We present our findings using Feeley’s framework outlined above, focusing 
on the stages of policy reform and attending to the conditions that might support, 
or compromise, reform efforts.  We begin by distinguishing between the problem 
definition and solution stages, which were initiated at the state level and were 
adapted to local conditions, and then move to a description of the local policy 
solutions and their implementation and routinization. 
 
V. FINDINGS 
 
A. Defining the Problem and Initiating Solutions: The ILS CAFA Initiative   
 
We observed above that in New York, ILS defined CAFA as an emergent 
problem with the imprimatur of the state’s highest court.  ILS also took the first 
step in initiating a solution by inviting indigent defense programs to apply for 
funding for new CAFA programs.  However, ILS leadership adopted an 
uncommon strategy for soliciting programmatic responses.  The agency’s early 
outreach to defense providers included email and in-person contact with defenders 
across the state, through which all were asked about major challenges facing their 
programs, and particularly in relation to providing CAFA.  These communications 
quickly revealed the diversity of issues faced around the state.  Providers identified 
acute staffing and resource shortages as the root cause of a range of systemic 
deficiencies including the failure to provide vertical representation, attorneys’ 
inability to communicate with non-English-speaking clients, and inefficient use of 
attorney time on administrative tasks.
59
  Moreover, defenders felt many of those 
issues were more pressing than their inability to provide CAFA.  
The agency’s Request for Proposals encouraged applicants to adopt new and 
innovative approaches tailored to local conditions “in the varied jurisdictions 
across the state” including “city courts, as well as . . . town or village courts. . . .”60  
Recognizing that funding might not be sufficient to ensure comprehensive CAFA, 
ILS permitted proposals that offered incremental changes.
61
  Applicants were 
                                                                                                                                      
58  Prior to the start date of the NIJ-funded research project (Jan. 1, 2015), the second author 
and ILS colleagues interviewed indigent defense providers, and their notes on those interviews 
became part of office archives and thence background material for this study.  Data collection 
protocols for the evaluation project were approved by the University’s Institutional Review Board. 
59  N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVS., ‘THREE DEFICIENCIES’ (2012) (internal 
agency memorandum analyzing provider responses regarding their programs’ top three challenges). 
60  N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVS., supra note 47, at 4. 
61  Id. (stating applicants “need not propose county-wide, all-courts solutions”). 
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encouraged to identify target courts based on “volume of arraignments or pretrial 
detention of persons arraigned, geographic considerations, or amenability to 
collaboration among the criminal justice entities involved in the proposal.”62  
 Most proposals were drafted by local indigent defense programs’ offices, and 
they varied much.  Feeley, who warns against the imposition of cookie-cutter 
solutions, would see this as a strength: “[I]f a single agency unilaterally 
implements a new policy that has system-wide impact, then it is likely to be 
greeted with resistance and adaptation.”63  In opting for an open solicitation, ILS 
anticipated more promising prospects of locally imagined initiatives.
64
   
We note that for statutory reasons, ILS’s opportunity to address CAFA 
ultimately constrained practical plans.  ILS funding comes from New York’s 
Indigent Legal Services Fund, a special revenue fund restricted to disbursement for 
specific purposes—in this case, indigent legal services.65  As a result, ILS could 
not entertain proposals that directed resources to other local criminal justice 
entities, like judges and law enforcement, even if proposed programs had resource 
implications for those agencies.  This restriction had two implications for those 
agencies’ interest in, and capacity for, participating in the new programs. 
First, ILS’s enabling legislation limited the agency’s role to initiatives that 
would “monitor, study, and make efforts to improve” public defense in New York 
but did not create an agency that could provide services to indigent defendant 
clients directly.  As a consequence, almost all of ILS’s budget, except funds 
needed to pay ILS staff, has historically been classified under “aid to localities”—
funding which can only be used to fund local governments, albeit at ILS 
discretion.
66
 
Second, ILS imposed a preclusion: grant funds were only available for 
programs that provided for “the physical presence of counsel with the client in 
court.”67  In New York, as elsewhere, courts have experimented with arraignments 
conducted by video links.  ILS excluded such arrangements in the CAFA grant 
solicitation, citing concerns about quality of representation, compromises to 
confidentiality and quality of pre-arraignment attorney-client communication, and 
the compromise of trustful attorney-client relationships.
68
 
                                                                                                                                      
62  Id. (further noting that “[n]o one specific basis is required nor do the bases noted here 
constitute an exclusive list”). 
63
  FEELEY, supra note 8, at 124. 
64  Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It 
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest 
of the country.”). 
65  N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 98-b. 
66  N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 832 (1). 
67  N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVS., supra note 47, at 3.  
68  See Eric T. Bellone, Private Attorney-Client Communications and the Effect of 
Videoconferencing in the Courtroom, 8 J. INT’L COM. L. & TECH. 24 (2013) (discussing lack of 
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B. Adapting the ILS Invitation to Local Needs: County Initiatives 
 
Not surprisingly, given the broad parameters of the solicitation, counties’ 
proposals included many strategies.  Mostly, they aligned with Feeley’s 
recommendation of a problem-oriented approach to reform: one that focuses less 
on the symbolic, ideological, or political reasons for the reform and more on the 
practical needs of the practitioners who have to put it into action.
69
  In planning 
reforms, program administrators in the five counties defined their task less in 
abstract terms regarding due process rights than in concrete problems to be 
overcome. 
The problems included geography, infrastructure, and personnel.  For 
instance, Moose County covers over 1,500 square miles with more than 2,500 
miles of mostly secondary roads and one of the lowest population densities in the 
state.  These facts posed formidable transportation challenges, since lawyers had to 
attend arraignments at over 30 widely scattered town and village courts.  Bleek 
County, which a court clerk described as “a piece of spaghetti,”70 stretches over 50 
miles from north to south, much of that distance served only by two-lane roads.  
Moose County’s administrator addressed the geography problem restricting CAFA 
to felony arraignments, which are less frequent than misdemeanors,
71
 while Bleek 
County initiated its CAFA program only within the city limits of its county seat.   
Infrastructure constrained plans in almost all counties.  The practical problem 
of where to keep arrestees prior to arraignment (when arraignments could not be 
conducted immediately) bedeviled parts of all jurisdictions.  Arrests that occurred 
during regular courthouse hours could be arraigned right away, but many arrests 
took place on weekends, after hours, or—in the cases of many magistrates’ 
courts—on days when the court was not open at all, requiring ad hoc arraignments.  
Where county jails were the only place to hold arrestees, program planners faced a 
Catch-22: law enforcement officers are not supposed to book defendants until they 
are arraigned, so if arraignments cannot be conducted promptly after arrests (and if 
they are delayed pending the arrival of a defense lawyer), police personnel and 
resources are tied up in monitoring arrestees, often outside of sanctioned holding 
facilities. 
Some counties had certified short-term holding facilities (usually in police 
                                                                                                                                                   
confidentiality in many video-conferencing systems used in client communication); see also Shari 
Seidman Diamond et al., Efficiency and Cost: The Impact of Videoconferenced Hearings on Bail 
Decisions, 100 J.  CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 869 (2010). 
69  FEELEY, supra note 8, at 132. 
70  Conversation with Bleek County Assigned Counsel Administrator, in Bleek County, N.Y. 
(2015).  
71  See 2011–2015 Dispositions of Adult Arrests, N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SERVS., http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/index.htm [https://perma.cc/N8P4-
C55B] (last visited Mar. 16, 2017) (36% of criminal court case dispositions outside New York City 
were felonies; 64% were misdemeanors). 
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departments) but most did not.  The lack of certified holding cells in courts in all 
five counties obliged law enforcement to take suspects to arraignments after hours 
when many judges and magistrates were hard to reach.  Simply getting defendants 
to courts for arraignments presented an array of challenges, and the logistics of 
notifying a judge, estimating times for transports, and concerns about prosecutors’ 
participation strained the capacity for ensuring CAFA in all five counties. 
These logistical challenges made timely arrival of defense lawyers seem less 
daunting, but that problem also proved an enduring challenge.  In Bleek County, 
where an assigned counsel program provided representation, the program 
administrator was candid about his reliance on “young and hungry” lawyers on the 
panel to pick up the arraignment calendars, but he also acknowledged that early 
plans to extend CAFA beyond daytime city court arraignments had stalled over the 
problem of timely dispatch of attorneys to distant town courts.
72
  The chief 
defender in Lake County asked all attorneys to rotate weekend shifts covering 
arraignments, while still allowing them the flexibility to trade shifts as needed.  In 
Moose County, where only felonies were guaranteed CAFA, the public defender’s 
young staff accepted the odd hours and taxing travel times as part of the costs of 
breaking into the business.  But none of these program administrators took for 
granted that the goodwill of their lawyers would last for long; all were mindful that 
more stable plans for ensuring CAFA would be needed.
73
 
In Hudson and Polar Counties, program administrators used their funds to add 
new lawyers to their staff.  In Hudson, the chief public defender assigned newly 
hired attorneys to off-hours arraignments, acknowledging that their patience for 
these assignments might wear thin.
74
  In Polar County, the administrator of an 
already busy urban defender office used ILS grant funds to hire two additional on-
call staff attorneys to exclusively cover arraignments in all town and village courts, 
starting with weekday business hours and then transitioning to 24/7 coverage 
through additional ILS funding.
75
  While all of these decisions represent 
compromises to full implementation of CAFA, they also reflect realistic 
assessments about the limits of resources and personnel. 
In short, in designing programs, administrators in all five counties focused 
less on the abstract or symbolic values of CAFA and more on the practical 
challenges of ensuring representation.  Not surprisingly this played out differently 
across different contexts.  Hence while ILS played a key role in advancing CAFA 
onto the reform agenda, and also established the broad parameters around which 
                                                                                                                                      
72  Conversation with Bleek County Assigned Counsel Administrator, supra note 70. 
73  Conversations with a Lake County public defender, Lake County Public Defender’s Office, 
in Lake County, N.Y. (2014, 2015). 
74  Conversation with a Hudson County public defender, Hudson County Public Defender’s 
Office, in Hudson County, N.Y. (2015). 
75  Conversation with a Polar County public defender, in Polar County Public Defender’s 
Office, in Polar County, N.Y. (2015). 
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programs might be designed, the agency left general strategies and details to local 
administrators, and those administrators’ ingenuity and pragmatism in adapting to 
local conditions may have been determinative in the successful implementation of 
CAFA programs. 
 
C. Implementation and Routinization of CAFA Programs   
 
Feeley suggested that, once planned, reforms were in jeopardy if they were 
linked to rigid protocols, were over-focused on prioritizing efficiency and cost 
savings (which might discourage initiative and creativity and risk), and were 
attempted in courts with high caseloads and overworked staff.
76
  The five counties’ 
programs that we studied appeared to have escaped these risks, probably because 
programs were designed to fit within the limits of the grant funds the counties 
received, and they did not appear to directly compete with other initiatives that 
were underway in these counties’ defense programs. 
Feeley also suggested that new programs had better prospects if they were 
adopted under conditions of agreement (within and across agencies) about the 
significance of the targeted problem and the value of the reform plan: specifically, 
when organizational leadership was established and respected, when resources 
were adequate, when a system-wide culture of collaboration was in play, and when 
the initiating organization had the capacity to acknowledge and accommodate 
other actors’ needs.  Perhaps most important, when the organization responsible 
for implementing and routinizing the policy has sufficient political capital, 
legitimacy, and resilience to withstand criticism and challenges, its reform idea has 
a fighting chance.
77
  We review here the five counties’ experiences with (1) 
consensus on the salience of the problem of CAFA, (2) the adequacy of resources 
that might backstop defenders’ plans for reform on CAFA (including plans for 
extending programs beyond the initial plan), (3) the character of indigent defense 
leadership and legitimacy within the broader courthouse and community culture, 
and (4) relatedly, the public defense programs’ capacity to respond to challenges to 
their CAFA programs, in the context of the broadly defined community 
constraints. 
 
1. Consensus on the Value of CAFA Programs 
 
Indigent defense providers mostly agreed that adoption of CAFA could 
improve their work, though for different reasons.  In all counties, defenders 
believed that when attorneys were present at arraignment or first appearance, 
justice was better served as more defendants were released on recognizance, were 
granted reasonable bail, or were released under supervision.  In most counties, 
                                                                                                                                      
76  FEELEY, supra note 8, passim. 
77
  Id. 
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defenders averred that CAFA allowed for (1) more opportunity to put together 
convincing bail arguments, (2) better odds of contacting, at an early point, family 
members who could assist defendants, and (3) better chances of ensuring that 
defendants who avoided pretrial detention might keep their jobs, stay with their 
families, and be routed into diversion and treatment programs.  These objectives 
speak directly to the client-oriented concerns of defense lawyers.  They saw CAFA 
as a new opportunity to intervene on behalf of clients and obtain benefits that 
perhaps had not existed previously.  In Bleek and Moose Counties, two defenders 
were quite direct in explaining another way their presence helped clients: they 
could “get the client to shut up” and not utter incriminating statements in open 
court.
78
 
In most counties, program personnel noted practical advantages in early 
attorney-client contact: CAFA attorneys could advise defendants to complete 
indigent defense eligibility paperwork promptly and hence more quickly establish 
a relationship with the attorney assigned to the case, and they could pass along 
their notes and observations to that attorney as well.  None of the programs 
attempted to initiate vertical representation at CAFA, for practical and professional 
reasons,
79
 but they recognized the value of having the CAFA lawyer’s notes on the 
case as it was handed off.  Although programs processed eligibility forms in 
different ways, and typically judges took responsibility for asking defendants 
whether they needed counsel and provided the applications for indigent defense, 
lawyers believed that their opportunity to advise defendants on the importance of 
this step resulted in higher rates of application and completion, and shorter periods 
from application to assignment.  In Bleek, Hudson, Lake and Polar Counties, 
attorneys often had defendants complete eligibility forms at arraignment.  In Bleek 
County we observed attorneys in the courthouse hallway after arraignment, 
carefully instruct defendants on the importance of completing the forms and 
submitting them within 48 hours.  A long term result may be earlier assignment, 
which lawyers believed might reduce times to disposition.   
Above and beyond these benefits, defenders in Moose and Polar Counties also 
emphasized that CAFA created opportunities to conduct more proactive and 
adversarial advocacy.  For example, arguments for timely dismissals on the 
grounds of faulty accusatory instruments might facilitate a disposition on the spot.  
In Moose County, the chief public defender believed that law enforcement, facing 
the new prospect of coordinating with defense counsel to convene at court in minor 
cases, had begun to issue appearance tickets more frequently rather than take 
                                                                                                                                      
78  Conversation with Moose County defense attorneys, in Moose County, N.Y. (2015). 
79  For example, in Bleek County the administrator assigned cases to lawyers based on case 
seriousness and difficulty, as well as attorney experience.  The CAFA attorney might not have the 
requisite credentials to handle the case all the way to completion. 
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suspects into custody.
80
  In Bleek County, the program administrator and panel 
attorneys were confident that CAFA obtained more adjournments in contemplation 
of dismissal—a disposition that results in dismissal of charges and sealing of court 
files, in most cases, unless the defendant is re-arrested within six to twelve 
months.
81
  Defenders in all counties observed that with or without CAFA, most 
judges were inclined to seek bail recommendations from prosecutors and 
sometimes law enforcement, even if they had to do so over the phone.  CAFA 
mitigated the inequity inherent in such proceedings by ensuring that defense 
counsel could counter those recommendations and develop a case for release or 
low bail. 
 
2. Adequate Resources 
 
Were the resources provided by ILS adequate for the CAFA programs in the 
five sites?  Or to put it another way, did applicants accurately judge the cost of 
putting their programs in place?  It appears that CAFA grants from ILS were 
adequate for the programs designed.  Defenders seldom expressed disappointment 
in those funds, nor did they complain that their offices had underestimated the time 
and effort needed to implement the CAFA plans.  With the exception of Moose 
County, where implementation plans were developed later than elsewhere, defense 
programs fulfilled their initial commitments to provide CAFA within their original 
timelines.  In Hudson County, the chief defender observed that staff were spread 
thin, but nonetheless managed the caseload efficiently enough that all defendants 
brought into court “in handcuffs” were provided with CAFA, prior to any 
eligibility screening, and office eligibility standards were significantly more 
inclusive than those in many other counties.
82
  With the smallest staff, the Moose 
County Public Defender Office was the most vulnerable to short-term shortages, 
and the chief defender told us that “there’s not enough of us, and not enough 
time.”83  
These defenders acknowledged that although they were living up to their 
commitments as funded by the grants, they would face greater challenges in 
                                                                                                                                      
80  See MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, THE PAST, PRESENT, AND 
POSSIBLE FUTURE OF DESK APPEARANCE TICKETS IN NEW YORK CITY (2014), http://www.pretrial.org/
download/research/The%20Past,%20Present,%20and%20Possible%20Future%20of%20Desk%20Ap
pearance%20Tickets%20in%20New%20York%20City%20-%20NYCJA%202014%20.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SP8V-6JDT] (discussing N.Y. CPL § 150.10). 
81  See NASSAU COUNTY LEGAL AID SOC’Y, ADJOURNMENT IN CONTEMPLATION OF DISMISSAL 
INFORMATION SHEET (May 13, 2016), http://nassau18b.org/forms/adjournment_in_contemplation_of
_dismissal.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4XC-3GY8] (discussing N.Y. CPL § 170.55). 
82  Conversation with a Hudson County public defender, in Hudson County Public Defender’s 
Office, in Hudson County, N.Y. (2015). 
83  Conversation with a Moose County public defender, Moose County Public Defender’s 
Office, in Moose County, N.Y. (Aug. 2015). 
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expanding CAFA to all arraignments.  Particularly in rural Bleek and Moose 
Counties, defenders discovered that their providing CAFA in, respectively, city 
court only and felony arraignments only, were manageable, but the prospective 
costs of expanding those programs loomed large.  Facing increasingly clear 
expectations from state officials that CAFA might eventually be expected in all 
cases,
84
 administrators became mindful of data that would inform the costs and 
resources attached to county-wide programs.  For example, officials in Bleek 
County observed that few lawyers lived or worked in the remote sections of the 
county, which would make CAFA impractical for night-time and weekend 
arraignments regardless of reimbursement options.  In Moose County, the small 
staff could be stretched across a vast and rugged county to cover felony 
arraignments, but the number of misdemeanor arrests is approximately twice that 
of felony arrests; tripling the number of arraignments would divert significant time 
toward arraignments, and away from other responsibilities.
85
 
In short, “resources” means more than funding, particularly in counties where 
the logistical challenges of delivering services would require more than marginal 
increases in existing activities and effort.  In fact, some of the most valuable 
resources were precisely those that ILS grant money could not buy: the willingness 
and capacity of other criminal justice agencies to coordinate in providing CAFA.  
Those resources include information sharing, cooperation in notification and 
scheduling arrestee transport, and flexibility in timing.  The CAFA grant program 
provided funds to be spent in defender programs, but no parallel resources were 
available to law enforcement, jails, city and magistrate courts, and district 
attorneys.  Hence, the resource challenges that emerged in most counties revolved 
around capacity to leverage these agencies’ participation in the absence of 
incentives.  Overcoming these challenges depended on the defense programs’ 
leadership and legitimacy with criminal justice agents, courthouses and county 
governments, and program leaders’ resilience and responsiveness in countering 
skepticism, resistance and threats to program continuity. 
 
3. Leadership and Legitimacy with Criminal Justice Communities 
 
Pushing through a change in process requires energy and commitment.  It also 
requires cooperation from practitioners in other agencies whose work would be 
affected by the new program.  We observed diverse administrative styles and 
                                                                                                                                      
84  See N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE TO THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE 
OF NEW YORK 2–5 (2016), http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judiciaryslegislative/pdfs/2016-CriminalLaw
&Procedure-ADV-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B758-C9TU] (reporting support for legislation to 
create centralized arraignments).  
85  In a ratio fairly typical of New York’s rural counties, in 2015 Moose County had 
approximately 500 felony arrests and over 1,000 misdemeanor arrests disposed in court.  See 2011–
2015 Dispositions of Adult Arrests, supra note 71. 
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office cultures, which existed in the varying contexts of communities and cultures.  
Defenders’ long-term organizational relationships with law enforcement, 
prosecutors, courts, and county governments appear to have influenced those 
actors’ receptivity to CAFA. 
 The chief public defender of Hudson County has been with the office since 
the 1980s and has been chief for over five years.  Office staff includes other 
lawyers with long tenure.  The chief is a progressive manager as well as an 
advocate for the office and its clients.  He is an active member of a local council of 
criminal justice agencies whose collaboration and endorsement he secured in 
developing the grant proposal; he maintains detailed records of case flow and 
outcomes; and he works in close consultation with the county’s information 
technology chief.  He is one of three public defenders in our sample who makes 
extensive use of a case management system for recording case notes and tracking 
case patterns.  He has also taken the initiative in seeking outside funding to 
improve jail conditions, and has instituted a risk assessment system for making bail 
recommendations at arraignment.  He is realistic about the limits of CAFA’s 
promise—he opined that at present, in his county, a prosecutor’s bail 
recommendation will almost always be accepted by a judge—yet his county was 
one of the first offices to implement its CAFA initiative.  A fellow county 
administrator summed up their opinion of the chief defender as “such a visionary   
. . . [who] is also very persistent and patient.”86   
In this county, according to the public defender, most judges agreed that 
CAFA is important, particularly for incarcerated defendants.  As was the case in 
many counties, the sticking point for implementing CAFA was the practical 
problem of getting arrestees, judges, and attorneys in one place, particularly 
outside of regular court hours.  The public defender had initially lobbied for a 
program that would centralize arraignments in “hub courts”—several courts 
located strategically that would hear all arraignments from surrounding towns and 
villages.  He reasoned that this would allow law enforcement to establish regular 
procedures for transporting arrestees between the county jail and these courts.  But 
he expressed willingness to compromise when it became clear that judges 
preferred to retain their authority over their local courts, and the county jail was 
too crowded to accept more responsibility.  Among the five counties, Hudson 
appears to have integrated CAFA most seamlessly into its day-to-day operations.  
But the chief defender was also frank about the process that brought key actors on 
board, “because it was the least common denominator option.”87 
Like the Hudson chief defender, Bleek County’s Assigned Counsel 
Administrator is a long-time county employee who took over managing the 
program more than two decades ago.  At that time, he inherited no more than “a 
                                                                                                                                      
86  Conversation with Hudson County administrator, in Hudson County, N.Y. (June 2015). 
87  Conversation with a Hudson County chief public defender, Hudson County Public 
Defender’s Office, in Hudson County, N.Y. (Apr. 2014). 
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shoebox full of papers” and has since developed a detailed record-keeping system 
that appears to be widely admired by the lawyers who work for the panel.
88
  The 
Bleek County administrator is not an attorney, but he prioritizes the 
professionalism and reputation of his panel: he stratifies the panel by expertise and 
abilities (saving the most challenging cases for the most experienced lawyers), and 
he removes from the panel lawyers whose work falls short of expectations.  His 
open-door policy ensures that his lawyers stop by often to see him and catch up on 
courthouse gossip; he organizes CLE classes; and he visits all the courts in the 
county throughout the year to observe proceedings.  His involvement in county 
politics, charitable organizations, the local community college, and the 
magistrates’ and county bar associations have allowed him to build both political 
capital and personal regard.  The authors discovered quickly that it was nearly 
impossible to accompany the administrator to lunch without pausing to be greeted 
by business owners, county officials, and neighbors.  At an early planning meeting 
about CAFA, this administrator secured the crucial endorsement of a key city court 
judge, lending additional legitimacy to his proposal to ILS. 
Polar County’s chief public defender moved to the public defender office after 
establishing a reputation in private civil and criminal practice.  After several years 
as a public defender, he was appointed to administer the office by the county 
legislature, an appointment that has been renewed multiple times by members of 
both parties.  This would seem to affirm his reputation, both locally and statewide, 
as an effective administrator who is also a well-liked boss and a professional 
organizer.
89
  He was characterized by an administrator in a nearby county as “the 
lawyer I’d want to have if I found myself in trouble.”90  A lawyer in the same 
county characterized his leadership style (and office culture) as “system guys,” 
oriented toward advocating for client rights in opposition to an unbalanced legal 
system.
91
  This office was also an early adopter of CAFA, and the chief defender 
believes that his was one of the first counties to be able to provide CAFA in all 
arraignments in all courts. 
Lake County’s chief defender advanced to that administrative role not long 
after the public defender office was created and, like colleagues in Hudson and 
Polar, had initiated a CAFA program before the ILS grant opportunity arose.  
                                                                                                                                      
88  Conversation with Bleek County Assigned Counsel Administrator, in Bleek County, N.Y. 
(2015). 
89  The Polar County office occupies a large floor in an aging downtown office building.  As is 
typical of such spaces, the offices and cubicles are tightly spaced and often shared, and file cabinets 
line the hallways.  As is atypical, however, every office is individually decorated with personal 
mementos, political posters, and strings of holiday lights.  The chief public defender has also 
organized a regional association of defenders that meets regularly to discuss upcoming legislation, 
relevant court decisions, and best practices. 
90  Conversation with program administrator (Mar. 2016). 
91  Conversation with a defense attorney on the Assigned Counsel Panel, in Bleek County, 
N.Y. (2015). 
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Despite a relatively brief tenure, the chief has established a strong reputation 
among colleagues as an innovator, and has successfully advocated for best 
practices for the office (such as caseload limits) and for innovations in the local 
courts (including participation in specialty courts).  Like the Polar County public 
defender, the Lake County chief defender has built a state-wide reputation as a 
respected professional, and participates at that level in policy and practice 
discussions.   
Establishing CAFA in Lake county required winning over the magistrates and 
city court judges, but a common challenge, winning over the sheriff responsible for 
transporting arrestees, was serendipitously already in play.  In Lake, the sheriff had 
already organized consolidated weekend arraignments in conjunction with a city 
judge, which simplified the public defender’s task to place counsel into the 
process.  The chief public defender described the sheriff as “common sense”—
willing to make accommodations to advance the CAFA program because they also 
advanced his agenda of managing jail and transit costs.
92
  This may be, in part, the 
result of the chief defender’s strategic presentation of the program as not only an 
investment in due process, but also an opportunity to reduce county jail costs by 
diverting deserving defendants, at arraignment, from pretrial detention.  
Lastly, the Moose County public defender, an able administrator in a small 
office, nonetheless seems to enjoy his reputation of an adversarial advocate and 
agitator at least as much as he is appreciated for his management skills.  He 
candidly volunteered, in a conversation about the district attorney that he “just 
couldn’t turn down a good fight.”93  During site visits, this chief defender was far 
more likely to initiate a conversation about a specific case, judge, or court than 
about a budget or staffing challenge, and he described with satisfaction his 
successful attempt to unionize his office staff.  The youthful lawyers in the office 
appear to follow his example.  Their banter often involves celebrating a 
disappointment suffered by the district attorney, and a chalkboard on the wall 
identifies each lawyer as an actor in action and adventure movies.  The combative 
culture in this office plays out against a history of animosity between the district 
attorney and the public defender; the former, facing multiple challenges to the 
office’s legitimacy and integrity, has over the past three years adopted 
controversial strategies and issued public pronouncements that overtly criticize not 
only the public defender but the CAFA project specifically. 
  
4. Political Capital and Resilience to Challenges 
 
To summarize, in Hudson, Lake, and Polar Counties, a confluence of 
circumstances allowed for relatively collaborative implementation of CAFA 
                                                                                                                                      
92  Conversation with chief public defender, Lake County Public Defender’s Office, in Lake 
County, N.Y. (2013). 
93  Conversation with Moose County Chief public defender, in Moose County (Aug. 2015). 
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programs.  Program administrators faced initial skepticism, but key actors in the 
criminal justice environment were cooperative at best, and disengaged at worst.  
Successful implementation hinged more on indigent defense programs’ capacity to 
accurately gauge their resource needs, mobilize and motivate their staff, and 
faithfully adhere to their programs’ plans and objectives.  That is not to say that 
these projects were easy to put (and keep) into place; rather, competent and 
attentive administrators with sufficient resources managed to respond to questions, 
doubts, and challenges as they built their CAFA programs. 
However, all programs faced five potential critical logistical and political 
quandaries that CAFA grant funds could not directly address, and where these 
problems loomed largest, programs faced the biggest implementation challenges.   
The first challenge was judges’ reluctance to engage in the program lest they 
commit to more time-consuming proceedings than they thought necessary when 
they were called to arraign arrestees outside normal court hours.  Many arrests 
occurred outside scheduled court sessions, and as we noted previously, in 
magistrates’ courts, those sessions can be as seldom as bi-monthly.  Hence 
arraignments might be held, in an ad hoc fashion, immediately after arrest, and 
wherever was convenient, and getting a defense lawyer to these events presented 
practical challenges.  Judges repeatedly expressed concerns about long waits 
between the arrival of the arresting officer and his or her arrestee, and the defense 
lawyer.
94
  The public defenders who successfully deflected this concern were those 
who minimized judges’ responsibility for off-hours arraignments, as was the case 
in Lake County, or who arranged to have counsel show up quickly in all 
jurisdictions, as was the case in Polar County.  In that county, the chief defender 
enlisted the support of the county’s supervising judge to invoke the Judicial 
Conduct Committee’s power to sanction magistrates who did not contact lawyers 
for arraignments.
95
  And in Moose County, where driving distances and waiting 
times were always long, the defender proactively began tracking the average of 
fifty minutes that it took for lawyers to reach court in an attempt to dispel stories of 
indefinite wait times and inconvenience to judges.
96
 
The second challenge was judges’ skepticism about the need for, and value of, 
CAFA.  While few argued against its constitutional status, many nonetheless 
maintained that arraignment was a formality, that a lawyer’s presence would not 
change decisions on pretrial release, bail, and disposition, and that the costs would 
                                                                                                                                      
94  In most counties the district attorney did not provide for staff to be present at these off-
hours arraignments, but commonly magistrates or clerks phoned the district attorney for a bail 
recommendation, a practice we heard described often, and witnessed multiple times. 
95  Conversation with the chief public defender, Polar County Chief Public Defender’s Office, 
in Polar County, N.Y. (May 2015). 
96  Conversation with the chief public defender, Moose County Public Defender’s Office, in 
Moose County, N.Y. (Aug. 2015). 
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outweigh the theoretical benefits.
97
  On this point, there was frank disagreement in 
all counties between at least some judges (particularly magistrates) and defense 
lawyers, and the latter’s frustration was evident in the Polar County’s chief 
defender’s assessment: “Sometimes I feel like they forget about the 
Constitution.”98 
The third challenge was judges’ concerns about maintaining autonomy in 
arraignments in their jurisdictions.  While New York permits arraignments in city 
or magistrate courts adjacent to those in which offenses allegedly occurred, and 
also permits city court judges, under some conditions, to arraign arrestees from 
anywhere in their counties, many magistrates felt that delegating their authority 
would be irresponsible, arguing that they were best suited to make judgements 
about local residents.  Hence proposals that would remove that authority were not 
well received even if they promised efficiency. 
The fourth challenge, therefore, was getting arrestees to courts, a problem for 
law enforcement as well as for judges.  In Bleek County, on some nights only one 
sheriff’s car was on road patrol, so diverting it for any period of time to oversee 
transport raised public safety concerns.
99
  Particularly where no local holding cells 
were available other than the county jail, off-hours arrests taxed law enforcement 
resources. 
The fifth potential challenge was resistance from the district attorney’s office, 
a challenge more political than pragmatic.  In Bleek County, the district attorney 
was running for re-election during the project’s term, and was vocal in local news, 
county budget meetings, and hallway conversations regarding his disdain for the 
CAFA program.  His primary complaint was that the program was not matched by 
a parallel funding opportunity for his office.
100
  In Moose County, the district 
attorney likewise criticized the CAFA program, maintaining that the grant 
permitting defenders to appear at arraignments was not matched by any grant 
permitting prosecutors to appear alongside them.
101
  The Lake County district 
                                                                                                                                      
97  We observed this sentiment most clearly at a meeting of the Magistrates’ Association in 
Bleek County, in 2015, when the question and answer session provided opportunities for attendees to 
pose questions about the CAFA program.  A dominant theme in these questions was the questionable 
need for CAFA, as weighed against the perceived costs to magistrates (and law enforcement) in 
expeditious processing of arraignments. 
98  Conversation with the chief public defender, Polar County Public Defender’s Office, in 
Polar County, N.Y. (May 2015). 
99  Conversation with a Bleek County magistrate, in Bleek County, N.Y. (2015). 
100 This district attorney’s views were documented in the city newspaper, press releases, and 
election campaign materials throughout 2014 and 2015 (documented in authors’ field notes and 
media records). 
101 This district attorney further implied in local media reports that the inequities in staffing 
and resources between that office and the public defender forced a reduction in prosecutorial 
appearances across local courts (documented in local media coverage, 2014 and 2015, and recorded 
in authors’ field notes).  
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attorney complained that with the new staffing provided by ILS grant money, the 
parity of attorney staffing with the public defender’s office would be too close to 
his own.
102
 
 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
  
This article describes the activities and the challenges that indigent defense 
program staff experienced as they attempted to implement CAFA programs in five 
upstate New York counties.  All of these programs are works in progress.  
Nevertheless, we can draw some conclusions about the conditions that made these 
reforms—some of them quite radical changes to existing local practices—viable, at 
least in the short periods of time that we have had to observe their implementation.  
When the National Institute of Justice awarded funding to study these CAFA 
reforms, the primary objective was to evaluate CAFA’s effects on case outcomes 
and the widely held (but seldom tested) arguments that CAFA would result in 
better pretrial decision making, quicker dispositions, and more effective 
advocacy.
103
  But we were mindful of the well-known cautions in evaluation 
research literature, and of Malcolm Feeley’s assessments of the particular risks in 
attempting to reform criminal courts: if new initiatives are not adopted, and 
adapted, in practical terms—if implementation of good ideas fails—then there is 
no reason to expect to find that the program produced the desired results.  Hence, 
we took advantage of the rare opportunity to investigate real-time implementation 
in these diverse counties even as we undertook systematic outcome evaluations.  
Here we address the limitations of the study, summarize the findings, and address 
the contributions of this study, and of this type of research, to practitioners, policy 
makers, and court researchers. 
 
A. Limitations of the Study 
 
There is an inherent tension between methodologies for understanding social 
and organizational behavior.
104
  Standardized analysis of systematically sampled, 
                                                                                                                                      
102 Conversation with a Lake County public defender, Lake County Public Defender’s Office, 
in Lake County, N.Y. (July 2013). 
103 See Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case 
for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719 (2002).  Social science research would 
seek a quantified estimate of the average or aggregated differences in outcomes associated with, and 
without CAFA, and draw policy conclusions at least in part from those results.  Under this 
methodology, if it “works,” it is a worthy policy.  We allow for a more nuanced perspective: that as a 
Constitutional right, CAFA should be provided regardless of empirical evidence, and that it, on 
average, improves the administration of justice in measurable ways. 
104 See GARY GOERTZ & JAMES MAHONEY, A TALE OF TWO CULTURES: QUALITATIVE AND 
QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2012) (describing tension between these 
epistemologies and research methodologies in the social sciences as so pervasive and profound as to 
constitute a difference in cultures and paradigms). 
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quantified data are reassuring to social scientists trained in statistical analysis.  The 
rigor offered by such methods can sometimes be had, however, only with the 
sacrifice of careful inquiry into the complexity of personal and organizational 
relationships, sequencing of events, and understanding of social and political 
contexts.  While we learned a great deal about the dynamics of reform in five 
counties, this study of implementation cannot be generalized to all reform efforts, 
or even to all upstate New York CAFA reform efforts.  Further, even though our 
observations and conclusions are based on extensive time on-site, and on ample 
observation and access to relevant information and documentation, we allow that 
with more information we might have drawn somewhat different conclusions.  We 
have incorporated the insights of many defense lawyers and administrators, a 
number of judges and magistrates, and those of law enforcement as often as 
possible, but we have included the perspectives of prosecutors only through their 
public pronouncements and media interviews, not through direct conversation.  
And of course, the conditions we observed and monitored over two years might 
change in the near future. 
 
B. Reprising Feeley: Fragmentation, Adversariness, and the Fallacy of Formalism 
 
The findings from this study offer some insights into an important question: if 
many reform attempts fail to launch, why did these five counties seemingly 
succeed?  Feeley’s theory gave us little reason to expect any success, yet we 
observed five instances of faithful adherence to plans.  We suggest that it was not 
because these programs faced no challenges but rather, because the process 
unfolded at the state, and then local, levels in a way that permitted them to bypass 
or overcome the roadblocks that Feeley described. 
Feeley’s cautions, in the main, are well founded.  He described courts as 
fragmented and adversarial.  He further described many attempted court reforms as 
fallacious, insofar as they were built on unrealistically formal notions of how court 
actors do their work.  He concludes that, as a result, the politicians and high-level 
administrators who identify problems and advocate for solutions are often out of 
touch with people who must implement them.  Furthermore, local administrators 
are frustrated by lack of consensus on the problem and doubts about the solution, 
as well as by the frequent unwelcome discovery that available resources fall short 
of actual needs.
105
  Because few reforms can be implemented solely within a single 
organization, leadership may also lack legitimacy in courthouses and communities 
to sell key actors and organizations on the new program; indeed, some of those 
parties may actively oppose or even undermine the reform. 
Did the CAFA reforms in upstate New York match this unpromising 
scenario?  The answers are incomplete, but offer room for some optimism about 
court reform.  First, having achieved a critical mass of state-level support for 
                                                                                                                                      
105 FEELEY, supra note 8, passim. 
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CAFA, ILS adopted a strategy for promoting reform that avoided the fallacy of 
formalism.  The call for CAFA proposals explicitly acknowledged the 
heterogeneity of local conditions and challenges, the need to suit programs to 
existing practices, and the potential value of diverse models.  Moreover, 
undertaking a CAFA program with ILS funding was optional, and very few 
constraints were placed on program plans.  In essence, ILS invited program 
administrators to experiment. 
And experiment they did.  The open-ended model enabled administrators to 
tailor programs to the specific problems and opportunities in their jurisdictions—
what Feeley calls a problem-solving perspective.  As a result, in most counties we 
studied there was consultation, both inside and outside the defender offices, about 
what was and was not possible.  Most programs centered on manageable changes, 
taking into account geographic, infrastructural, and personnel limitations.  
Administrators were candid about the need to consider their attorneys’ incentives 
and constraints, and to distribute both the rewards and burdens of CAFA programs 
equitably; perhaps as a result, none reported that staff members resisted the new 
programs.  Most counties’ plans also were incremental, recognizing the virtues of a 
gradual process of change.  Indeed, the first county to achieve CAFA in all courts, 
on all days, and at all hours, was Polar County, where the indigent defense 
program had initiated CAFA in its largest court well before the ILS program 
started.
106
   
Second, it is true that the criminal courts in upstate New York are 
fragmented:
107
 the organizations and officials who work within them have 
independent and sometimes conflicting professional values, responsibilities, 
objectives, and lines of accountability.  Because most CAFA programs relied on 
the collaboration of other criminal justice actors, and because no new resources 
were available to those actors, administrators relied on their leadership skills as 
well as their legitimacy and standing in their communities to get their programs off 
the ground.  In Bleek, Polar, Lake and Hudson Counties in particular, defense 
program administrators already had institutionalized relationships with judges, law 
enforcement, and county officials, and they capitalized on this to get CAFA out of 
the gate.  In counties where magistrates presided over many arraignments, they did 
not hide their loyalty to their own towns and villages and their skepticism about 
reforms.  But two years after program adoption, administrators reported fewer 
                                                                                                                                      
106 This announcement was made at a regional meeting of indigent defense providers in 
March, 2016. 
107 See SPECIAL COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF N.Y. STATE COURTS, A COURT SYSTEM FOR THE 
FUTURE: THE PROMISE OF COURT RESTRUCTURING IN NEW YORK STATE 7 (2007), http://nycourts.gov/
reports/courtsys-4future_2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CQK-AWGT] (“New York State has the most 
archaic and bizarrely convoluted court structure in the country.  Antiquated provisions in our state 
Constitution create a confusing amalgam of trial courts: an inefficient and wasteful system that 
causes harm and heartache to all manner of litigants, and costs businesses, municipalities and 
taxpayers in excess of half a billion dollars per year.”).   
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hold-outs and even some advocacy from magistrates for universal CAFA in their 
courts.   
Third, adversarial adjudication systems are premised on conflict, formally 
expressed and practiced at the case level.  We found evidence in all sites that some 
defense lawyers indeed defined their role in these terms.  In Moose and Polar 
Counties, in particular, lawyers took some pride in leveraging opportunities 
presented by defective accusatory instruments, the discovery of arcane but useful 
precedents, and lapses of prosecutorial attentiveness.  This working style played 
out at the level of individual case decisions, but also reflected an office culture that 
supported an aggressive style of lawyering.  But at the policy level, the more 
relevant adversarialism was at the organizational and leadership levels and often 
appeared to have roots not in professional identities but rather in politics.  Hence in 
Bleek and Moose Counties, the district attorneys’ open challenges to the CAFA 
programs were seen by defenders as just another in a long series of public 
criticisms and complaints.  In most counties, and especially in Bleek County, this 
sort of resistance from the prosecutors’ offices was mitigated by the mutually 
supportive relationships that leadership had developed with other actors in county 
and local government.  In Moose County, the public defender, who had the key 
support of his predecessor (a vocal advocate for CAFA at the state level), remained 
unperturbed by the district attorney’s resistance. 
 
C. Implications for Research, Practice and Policy  
 
Much social scientific research on criminal court reforms focuses on finding 
correlations between court characteristics (such as caseloads and political 
environment) and outcomes such as case processing delays and average sentences, 
drawing inferences about how the former affect the latter.  This study offered an 
opportunity to document, in real time, the implementation of a reform.  By 
comparing sites that accepted invitations to create local interpretations of CAFA 
programs, we uncovered features of court environments that are sometimes 
overlooked by researchers, but that merit closer scrutiny in future scholarship.   
First, we observed that rural and suburban magistrates’ courts play an 
outsized role in reform implementation—yet these small local courts are seldom 
included in studies.  Second, we recognized the importance of political 
relationships between public defenders and district attorneys.  In our study we saw 
hints of successful political strategies by defenders, and also of collegial and 
respectful relations among court professionals seeking to implement reform, while 
maintaining their courtroom identities as adversaries.  Third, particularly in Bleek 
and Moose Counties, we had the opportunity to observe the distinctive cultures of 
indigent defense programs.
108
  We suspect that the office culture—the degree of 
                                                                                                                                      
108 See LISA J. MCINTYRE, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER: THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE SHADOWS OF 
REPUTE (1987); JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL 
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social solidarity and support, consensus on values, and dominant work ethic—
shapes the potential for initiating reforms, and the chances for their successful 
implementation.  In short, this research highlighted characteristics of courts and the 
professionals who work within them that are difficult to quantify, but important to 
investigate nonetheless. 
The findings presented here are not conclusive, but they may have 
implications for practice and policy, particularly for court professionals who are 
contemplating or embarking upon similar reform efforts.  It is worth noting that the 
sites we studied were not obliged to participate in the NIJ evaluation as a condition 
for receiving the ILS CAFA grant money, yet all have proven to be enthusiastic 
participants; throughout the process they have been accessible and generous with 
their time, knowledge and resources.  We speculate that they are exemplars: offices 
that are particularly open to innovation, willing to experiment, and resilient to the 
sorts of challenges that Feeley described.
109
  One might learn from their 
experiences not only about pitfalls, but also about problem-solving strategies.  The 
ILS grant program expressly solicited plans that might serve as models for other 
counties, and perhaps ILS attracted those kinds of applicants: indigent defense 
programs whose leadership and experience promised enough traction to design and 
implement programs that might work. 
In terms of policy, we observe that CAFA advanced from being a low-
visibility concern in criminal proceedings to a centerpiece of reform advocacy in a 
relatively short time.  Even more quickly, in New York, it progressed from an ILS 
agency priority to a statewide experiment and, during the writing of this article, 
was established as a key part a successful legislative proposal to reform upstate 
indigent defense.
110
  As we noted previously, there is scant information on how 
often CAFA is provided, but what exists suggests that it is not a regular protocol in 
                                                                                                                                                   
ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1977); Johnathan A. Rapping, Directing the Winds of Change: 
Using Organizational Culture to Reform Indigent Defense, 9 LOYOLA J. PUB. INT. L. 177 (2008). 
109 The study of exemplars—organizations that are successful in providing good products or 
services, or that consistently overcome challenges that are common in their fields—requires attention 
to organizational history, culture, and leadership.  To our knowledge, this methodology has seldom 
been applied to criminal justice organizations, but has been used by evaluators in other service 
provision settings.  See, e.g., Karen Somerville, Strategies to Improve Client Service: Exemplars in 
the Canadian Federal Government, 16 INNOVATION J.: PUB. SECTOR INNOVATION J. 1 (2011); Greta 
Tubbesing & Frederick M. Chen, Insights from Exemplar Practices on Achieving Organizational 
Structures in Primary Care, 28 J. AM. BOARD FAM. MED. 190 (2015);  Karen M. Emmons, 
Kasisomayajula Viswanath & Graham A. Colditz, The Role of Transdisciplinary Collaboration in 
Translating and Disseminating Health Research: Lesson Learned and Exemplars of Success, 35 AM. 
J. PREVENTIVE MED. S204 (2008).  
110 See An Act to Amend the County Law, the Executive Law and the State Finance Law, in 
Relation to Indigent Defense Services, N.Y. Assembly Bill A06202C (June 2016), http://assembly.
state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&leg_video=&bn=A06202&term=2015&Summary=Y&Actions=Y&Co
mmittee%26nbspVotes=Y&Floor%26nbspVotes=Y&Memo=Y&Text=Y [https://perma.cc/N8SX-
9U8K] (requiring provision of counsel at all criminal arraignments). 
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many or most courts.  But as it emerges as a national issue, states will need models 
for exporting this right, in useable form, out of the statehouse and into local 
courthouses.   
 
 
 
 
